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Abstract 
In April 2011, France reintroduced internal border checks with Italy to prevent mobility by 
North African immigrants who hold temporary residence permits issued by Italy and who had 
entered the EU from Tunisia as a result of revolutions and war in the southern Mediterranean 
region. This has caused a diplomatic row between the two countries, as well as reactions by 
other EU member states and at the EU levels. This paper examines the compatibility of the 
Italian and French measures with EU border legislation and legal principles as well as the 
foundations of the Schengen regime. It argues that the Franco-Italian affair illustrates a ‘race to 
the bottom’ on European principles of solidarity, loyal cooperation and fundamental rights. The 
affair ultimately reveals the very limits and unfinished elements of the EU’s immigration and 
border policies. Finally, the paper puts forward policy recommendations to the parties involved. 
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A Race against Solidarity 
The Schengen Regime and the Franco-Italian Affair 
Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild, Massimo Merlino and Joanna Parkin
* 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, April 2011 
Introduction 
The effects of the turmoil in North Africa on human movements and displacements, both in 
North Africa and towards Europe, have been well documented by the media and politicians 
during the last months. Certain member states of the EU have most visibly faced the challenges 
of migratory movements from North Africa because of their territorial location as ‘gatekeepers’ 
of the common EU external border in the Mediterranean.  
Italy has been a case in point, with Interior Minister Roberto Maroni repeatedly expressing 
concerns to Italy’s Schengen counterparts and the European Commission, and calling for more 
‘European solidarity’ in handling the entries of asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants 
through its territory, particularly through the island of Lampedusa. The presumed isolation and 
lack of assistance from the EU even prompted Maroni to question the value of Italy continuing 
to be a member of the EU.
1 
These past weeks have witnessed yet again another test of the capacity of Europe’s immigration 
and border policies to provide a legitimate, common and fundamental rights-compliant answer 
to the dilemmas posed by migratory flows in this period of reform and instability in North 
Africa. Since the beginning of April 2011, Italian authorities have issued temporary residence 
permits for humanitarian protection to undocumented North African immigrants from Tunisia 
who arrived in Italy before 5 April 2011.
2 These residence permits grant them an automatic 
right to move freely within the Schengen territory and other EU member states. In response to 
the Italian measure, France introduced internal border checks between the two countries, which 
have resulted in pushing back hundreds of immigrants holding these permits during the last 
three weeks
3 and the blocking of trains from Ventimiglia, the last Italian town before the French 
border, carrying some 300 migrants and NGO representatives on 17 April 2011.
4  
                                                            
* Sergio Carrera is Senior Research Fellow and Head of Section at the Justice and Home Affairs Section 
at the Centre for European Policy Studies, where Elspeth Guild is Associate Senior Research Fellow, 
Massimo Merlino is a researcher and Joanna Parkin is a research assistant. 
1 See V. Pop, “Italian minister questions value of EU membership”, EUobserver.com, 11 April 2011 
(http://euobserver.com/22/32155?print=1). 
2 See the press release of the Italian ministry of interior, “Maroni: ‘Ai migranti un permesso di soggiorno 
temporaneo’”  http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/notizie/ 
immigrazione/000069_2011_04_07_informativa_Maroni_alla_Camera.html_661262205.html).  
3 Refer to the report by La Repubblica TV, “A Ventimiglia gli immigrati che sognano la Francia”, 21 
March 2011 (http://www.tg1.rai.it/dl/tg1/2010/articoli/ContentItem-4055960b-e68d-49a0-a28d-
310906c5d49f.html and http://tv.repubblica.it/home_page.php?playmode=player&cont_id= 
65313&ref=search). 
4 See “France angers Italy after blocking migrants at border”, Euronews.net, 17 April 2011 
(http://www.euronews.net/2011/04/17/france-angers-italy-after-blocking-migrants-at-border); see also 
“France blocks pro-migrant protest”, Euronews.net, 17 April 2011 
(http://www.euronews.net/2011/04/17/france-blocks-pro-migrant-protest); and “France blocks Italian 2 | CARRERA, GUILD, MERLINO & PARKIN 
 
This has caused a bilateral diplomatic row between the Italian and French governments, which 
is persisting at the time of writing and whose final solution is likely to come from the EU level 
in Brussels, and potentially before the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Other EU member 
states, such as Germany and Belgium, have also expressed concerns about the Italian measures, 
but unlike France they have not reintroduced internal border controls with Italy so far. A harsh 
reaction came for example from the Netherlands, where Prime Minister Mark Rutte declared 
that “[a]ny Tunisian who got in through the Berlusconi arrangement, must leave the 
Netherlands”.
5 Other EU member states, such as Austria, Germany and Belgium, have also 
expressed concerns about the Italian measures.
6 The case has finally attracted the attention of 
the European Commission, which according to information provided in a press briefing on 18 
April 2011,
7 is waiting for an official letter to be issued by the French government providing 
detailed information on the reintroduction of internal border controls with Italy.  
The Franco-Italian affair raises several EU-relevant issues in need of reflection and critical 
assessment, not least in view of their effects on the legal commitments that both France and 
Italy have under the EU’s migration policy and border law. Yet also and more generally are the 
wider implications of the affair for the political legitimacy of the Schengen border regime 
within and outside Europe, in a case presenting such significant foreign affairs consequences for 
Europe’s ‘southern neighbourhood’ and Africa. 
A first question relates to the legality of the Italian measures and the French border practices in 
light of European legislation. Both countries are members of the Schengen regime, and 
consequently they are bound to respect the rules stipulated in the Schengen acquis when 
managing the common EU external borders and guaranteeing the principle of free movement of 
persons within their internal territories. The Franco-Italian affair especially calls for a test of the 
consistency of the national immigration measures and actions with the common corpus of 
legislation on border crossings harmonized by the Schengen Borders Code (SBC).  
Beyond these legalistic considerations, a second important aspect is that of the negative 
repercussions of the case on the general principles of law at the foundations of Europe’s 
immigration policy and the Schengen system as a whole. More specifically, these are the 
principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, and sincere and loyal cooperation, as 
well as respect of the fundamental human rights of persons on the move.  
This paper examines the compatibility of the Italian and French measures with EU border 
legislation. It tests the national laws and practices in the Franco-Italian affair against EU rules 
and principles. On the basis of the results stemming from our assessment, the paper argues that 
the Franco-Italian affair illustrates a ‘race to the bottom’ on European solidarity as well as a 
challenge to the legitimacy of the Schengen regime and the EU’s border policy.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
trains carrying migrants”, BBC News, 17 April 2011 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
13109631).  
5 See P. van der Ploeg, “Tunesiërs uit Italië niet welkom in Nederland”, NRC Handelsblad, 8 April 2011 
(http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2011/04/08/tunesiers-met-italiaanse-verblijfsvergunning-niet-welkom-in-
nederland/).  
6 See S. Pignal and J. Chaffin, “Italy’s release of EU migrants strains EU ties”, Financial Times, 12 April 
2011 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0c7f70cc-646e-11e0-a69a-00144feab49a.html#axzz1K9R77IoD); see 
also D. Mara, “Germany tells Italy to ‘solve its own problems’ in Tunisian refugee row”, Deutsche Welle, 
10 April 2011 (http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,14980272,00.html). 
7 Refer to the European Commission’s Midday Press Briefing of 18 April 2011 
(http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/player/streaming.cfm?type=ebsvod&sid=178405).  A RACE AGAINST SOLIDARITY: THE SCHENGEN REGIME AND THE FRANCO-ITALIAN AFFAIR | 3 
 
The scope of the case goes beyond an anecdotal example of the temporary reintroduction by an 
EU member state of internal border controls in the Schengen area. It rather needs to be 
interpreted as a tangible instance of repressive policy responses emerging in a context of 
widespread anti-immigration and xenophobic political discourses expressed by certain EU 
national leaders, which artificially link human mobility (and especially that labelled as ‘illegal 
immigration’), with insecurity and criminality.  
Additionally, it has visible impacts on the fundamental rights and freedoms of those hundreds of 
persons who have faced ‘the borders’ imposed by France. It also affects the EU’s foreign 
relations because of the message being sent from these EU member states about the kind of 
solidarity that the countries and populations in North Africa experiencing democratic uprisings 
and violence can expect from the EU. 
From this viewpoint, not only does the Franco-Italian affair entail several legal and political 
questions that directly challenge the principles of solidarity and sincere/loyal cooperation 
between member states in a dispute. It also reveals the very limits and unfinished elements of 
the EU’s immigration policy. 
1.  Testing legality in the Franco-Italian affair 
The relevance of the affair at the EU level stems directly from France and Italy’s membership in 
the Schengen regime. Almost 25 years after its inception,
8 and 16 since its formal 
implementation, Schengen continues to be one of the central political components of the EU’s 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). The AFSJ has been established and to a large 
extent developed on the basis of achieving a common external border policy along with a 
common internal space exempted from internal border controls, where the right to free 
movement of persons is duly guaranteed and promoted.  
The Schengen regime relies on the absence of any controls on persons (independent of their 
nationality),
9 “in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border 
controls”. Membership of the EU does not fully correspond with that of Schengen. Currently, 
there are 22 EU member states in the Schengen area,
10 to which we need to add 4 non-EU 
member states (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein).  
The operability of the Schengen system and the Europeanization of border and immigration 
policies have led to various important consequences for its members, which are also of special 
significance when examining the background of the Franco-Italian affair. 
First, certain member states, especially those in southern (Mediterranean) and south-eastern 
Europe have become the territorial external borders of the Union. Their own external borders 
have been transformed into those of the Schengen territory. They now hold the main 
responsibility for checking the entry conditions and determining the lawfulness of crossing the 
territorial external borders for the entire ‘Schengenland’. This transformation has been 
particularly apparent in relation to the migration movements from Africa to Europe through the 
Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and their dramatic and humanitarian considerations. 
                                                            
8 See the Agreement between the governments of the states of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common 
borders, signed at Schengen, 14 June 1985. This was succeeded by the 1990 Convention Implementing 
the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, OJ L 239, 22.09.2000. 
9 Refer to Art. 77.1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
10 Five EU member states currently do not participate in Schengen:  Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania 
and the UK. 4 | CARRERA, GUILD, MERLINO & PARKIN 
 
Second, Schengen relies heavily on a high degree of confidence among the participant states at 
times of automatically recognizing the positive or negative decisions (border checks)
11 taken by 
any member country to allow entry into the common territory and the crossing of the external 
border. It is firmly embedded in a profound level of solidarity and cooperation among the 
participating states.
12 The system has also been founded on a premise of imagining the 
Schengen system as equivalent to an internal space, where the divide between the internal and 
external borders of the nation-state (and differentiation between inside and outside) are no 
longer supposed to be relevant and internal frontier controls constitute an exception to the 
general rule, which is free mobility. 
Third, the abolition of internal border controls has led to a situation whereby immigration policy 
measures and border control practices by one member state have immediate (or potential) 
knock-on effects for the other members of the ‘Schengen club’. Border checks are no longer in 
the exclusive interest of the member state at whose external borders ‘the control’ is supposed to 
occur, but in that of all EU member states having abolished internal border controls and 
participating in a common space of free circulation.
13 
Schengen now has a set of consolidated legal contours. Since 2006, the previously fragmented 
and obscure Schengen acquis has benefitted from a common corpus of legislation that has taken 
the shape of a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across the 
borders – the SBC. It provides a common and transparent set of harmonized rules and 
procedures for crossing the external borders of the EU, which are legally binding for (and 
enforceable upon) all Schengen members.
14 The European Commission has recently presented a 
revision of the SBC, designed to improve the clarity of the Schengen rules and the efficiency of 
border crossing procedures.
15 
Indeed, no longer can France or Italy behave as freely as they would like to when it comes to 
powers to control of the admission, expulsion and access to rights by non-EU nationals. The 
SBC constitutes the materialization of a common set of European rules, standards and general 
(rule of law) principles that have reduced the margin of manoeuvre and sovereignty of EU 
member states over the management of human mobility and frontiers.  
The next two sections of this paper examine the consistency of the measures taken in the 
Franco-Italian affair with the SBC, in particular the lawfulness of the Italian residence permits 
granting an automatic right to free movement and the reintroduction by France of internal 
border controls. 
                                                            
11 According to Art. 2.10, border checks are to be understood as “checks carried out at border crossing 
point[s], to ensure that persons, including their means of transport and the objects in their possession, may 
be authorized to enter the territory of the Member States or authorized to leave it”. 
12 Art. 3.2 TEU states that “[t]he Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice 
without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with 
appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention 
and combating of crime”. 
13 Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, OJ L 
105/1, 13.4.2006, Recital 6 of the Preamble. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See European Commission, Proposal amending Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of 
persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) and the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement, COM(2011) 118 final, Brussels, 10 March 2011. A RACE AGAINST SOLIDARITY: THE SCHENGEN REGIME AND THE FRANCO-ITALIAN AFFAIR | 5 
 
2.  The lawfulness of the Italian temporary-residence permits 
The decree of the President of the Council of Ministers (DPCM) adopted in Italy on 5 April 
2011 provides for the issue of temporary residence permits for humanitarian reasons in favour 
of “citizens of North African countries” who arrived in Italy from 1 January 2011 to 5 April 
2011.
16  
The decree was adopted on the basis of Art. 20 of the Italian Single Text on Immigration, which 
establishes measures of temporary protection in cases of “exceptional events”.
17 In an attempt to 
provide grounds for the decree, the Italian authorities passed a second DPCM, which declared in 
rather contradictory terms a “state of humanitarian emergency in the territory of North Africa in 
order to effectively contrast the exceptional flow of migrants in the Italian territory”.
18 So, while 
acknowledging that a humanitarian state of emergency was taking place in North Africa, the 
decree proposed action to mitigate its effects solely on the Italian territory, whereas – and as 
discussed in section 3.1 – there was no such emergency in terms of the total number of entries 
into the Italian territory compared with those taking place in North Africa.  
These acts need to be seen in conjunction with the bilateral agreement signed on 5 April 2011 
by the Italian government with the Tunisian authorities.
19 Even though the precise content of the 
agreement has not been made publicly available, it seems that it allows for the “swift 
repatriation” of migrants from Tunisia who landed on Italian shores after 5 April.
20 On 18 April 
2011, according to Roberto Maroni, 330 of the approximately 800 Tunisians who were still in 
Lampedusa had been repatriated.
21  
The modalities through which these returns have been carried out may give rise to tensions in 
light of the procedural guarantees foreseen by the Returns Directive (2008/115/EC)
22 as well as 
fundamental rights. For a start, those migrants who are pending forced removal have been kept 
in provisional structures (such as gyms, harbour hangars, stations and other public places) 
whose compatibility with the safeguards provided by the Returns Directive on specialized 
detention facilities remains contested. Furthermore, it appears that the migrants have not been 
                                                            
16 DPCM del 5 aprile 2011 – Protezione temporanea, Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 81 dell’8 aprile 2011. 
17 Dlgs 286/1998, Art. 20, states that “extraordinary measures for the reception [of third-country 
nationals] in case of exceptional events” establishes the possibility to adopt through a DPCM measures of 
temporary protection in instances of relevant humanitarian needs, conflicts, natural disasters or other 
events of special gravity occurring in countries that are not EU member states.   
18 Decreto Del Presidente Del Consiglio Dei Ministri, 7 aprile 2011, Dichiarazione dello stato di 
emergenza umanitaria nel territorio del Nord Africa per consentire un efficace contrasto all’eccezionale 
afflusso di cittadini extracomunitari nel territorio nazionale, Gazzetta, n. 83 del 11 aprile 2011 
(http://www.gazzettaufficiale.biz/atti/2011/20110083/11A04894.htm). 
19 Refer to the article “Franco-Italian row over Tunisian migrants escalates”, EUobserver.com, 18 April 
2011 (http://euobserver.com); refer also to “Italy accord with Tunisia, repatriation for new immigrants”, 
ANSA.IT, 6 April 2011 (http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/rubriche/english/2011/04/06/ 
visualizza_new.html_1526558772.html). 
20 On the basis of the agreement, Italy will also donate 6 motorboats, 4 patrol boats and 100 off-road 
vehicles to the Tunisian police force, to help re-launch regular patrols of the coast 
(http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/notizie/immigrazione/00006
5_2011_04_12_Audizione_Maroni_Commissione_Camera.html_661262205.html). 
21 See “Tunisia, saranno rimpatriati 800 migranti”, Rai News 24, 8 April 2011 
(http://www.rainews24.rai.it/it/news.php?newsid=151696).  
22 See Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on 
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country 
nationals, OJ L 348/98, 24.12.2008. In particular these are envisaged in Arts. 12, 13 and 14. 6 | CARRERA, GUILD, MERLINO & PARKIN 
 
properly notified of the expulsion decisions and final destination of return (or ‘deferred 
pushback’) adopted by the quaestor. Finally, it is also apparent that they have not been offered 
the possibility to obtain legal advice and lodge an appeal against the adopted decision (Vassallo, 
2011).  
In any case, one of the most contested issues concerning these temporary residence permits has 
been the recognition by the Italian authorities of an automatic right of free movement for the 
holders and the issuance of travel documents to the applicants in addition to the residence 
permits.
23  
In a circular disseminated by the French Minister of Interior Claude Guéant on 6 April 2011,
24 
the French government implicitly challenged the legality of the temporary residence permits 
issued by Italy. The circular orders a strict interpretation of the Schengen rules underpinning 
free movement for third-country nationals (TCNs) in France, effectively blocking the settlement 
of Tunisian migrants holding the temporary Italian permits. The circular gives strict instructions 
to regional police authorities when carrying out checks on immigrants, stating that TCNs must 
hold a valid travel document and emphasizing that the inability of an immigrant to prove s/he 
has sufficient (financial) resources is a legitimate ground for return. Two weeks after the 
publication of the circular, the French authorities justified border controls and the blocking of a 
train carrying immigrants and political activists across the French-Italian border as a response to 
public order concerns resulting from an “undeclared and unauthorised” demonstration planned 
by activists to support the free circulation of these immigrants.
25  
As mentioned in the introduction, the contestation by France of the legality of the Italian 
permits was accompanied by expressions of concern by Germany and other northern European 
countries. The interior ministers of Germany, Belgium and Austria have all made threats to 
reinstate border checks.
26 Austrian Interior Minister Maria Fekter warned that Italy’s actions 
risked the “collapse of the Schengen system”, while German Interior Minister Hans-Peter 
Friedrich called Italy’s actions “a violation of the Schengen spirit”, accusing Italy of 
“politicis[ing] the whole Tunisian immigration issue so that everyone in the EU is affected by 
it”.
27 Similar accusations regarding the illegality of Italy’s actions have been echoed by the 
Belgian Secretary of State for migration,
28 and more general fears over the potentially damaging 
impact on Schengen cooperation are shared by member states including the Netherlands, 
Finland and Slovakia. That notwithstanding, according to declarations by Roberto Maroni, 
“[w]e have given the migrants travel documents, and…everything [else] needed, and the 
European Commission recognized that, it has said that Italy is following the Schengen rules”.
29 
                                                            
23 Art. 2.3 expressly states that the permit allows the concerned person, who is holding travel documents, 
to freely move across EU member states.  
24 Ministére de l’interieur, de l’outre-mer, des collectivitités territoriales et de l’immigration, 
Autorisations de séjour délivrées à ressortissants de pays tiers par les Etats membres de Schengen, 6 avril 
2011 (http://www.lefigaro.fr/assets/pdf/110407-circulaire-gueant.pdf).  
25 See « Regain de tension entre Rome et Paris au sujet d’un train d’immigrés tunisiens », France24.com, 
18 April 2011 (http://www.france24.com/fr/20110417-italie-france-immigration-clandestine-tunisie-train-
dignite-bloque-gare-vintimille-frontiere-migrants). 
26 See Pignal and Chaffin (2011) op. cit. and Mara (2011), op. cit.  
27 Refer to V. Pop, “Italian minister questions value of EU membership”, EUobserver.com, 11 April 2011 
(http://euobserver.com/22/32155?print=1). 
28 See C. Spillman, “North Africa migration tests EU open border system”, AFP, 20 April 2011. 
29 Quotation derived from Italy’s Sky TG24 TV.  A RACE AGAINST SOLIDARITY: THE SCHENGEN REGIME AND THE FRANCO-ITALIAN AFFAIR | 7 
 
In a press briefing on 18 April 2011,
30 the Commission seemed to support the French position 
by confirming that while the Italian authorities are free to issue temporary residence permits for 
humanitarian considerations, the latter cannot grant an automatic right of free travel in the 
Schengen area. That, the Commission argued, is because the applicants must in any case comply 
with all first-entry conditions stipulated by the SBC, such as that alleged by France on sufficient 
financial means for subsistence. 
Therefore, who is right in this dispute? Have the Italian authorities violated the SBC when 
issuing the temporary residence permits? The following three aspects need to be taken into 
consideration when assessing the legality of the Italian decree and the nature of the temporary 
residence permits for humanitarian protection: first, the significance of compliance with the 
first-entry conditions when moving within the Schengen territory; second, the nature and scope 
of the temporary residence permit; and third, the intended public goal pursued by the Italian 
measures. 
2.1  The relevance of first-entry conditions 
The abolition of internal border controls and freedom of movement are based on the obligation 
of the country that is the first point of entry to verify compliance by the individual with a series 
of criteria determining the legality of the act of crossing the common external border. According 
to Art. 5.1 of the SBC, the Italian authorities were required to examine the following entry 
conditions applying to TCNs “for stays not exceeding three months per six-month period”:  
1)  possession of a valid travel document or documents authorizing the crossing of the 
border;  
2)  possession of a valid visa, in light of the conditions stipulated in the Community Code on 
Visas;  
3)  justification of the purpose and conditions of the intended stay and “sufficient means of 
subsistence for the duration of the intended stay and for the return to their country of 
origin”;  
4)  whether the individual is subject to an alert in the Schengen Information System (SIS) for 
the purpose of refusing entry into the Schengen territory; and  
5)  whether the person is considered a “threat to public policy, internal security, public health 
or the international relations of any of the member states”.
31  
Art. 5.4(b) of the SBC states that those TCNs who fulfil all the conditions stipulated in Art. 5.1, 
except that concerning a visa, and who present themselves at the common EU external border 
“may be authorized to enter the territories of the Member States if a visa is issued at the border” 
in light of Council Regulation No. 415/2003 on the issue of visas at the border of 27 February 
2003.
32 
                                                            
30 See Pignal and Chaffin (2011) op. cit. and Mara (2011), op. cit. 
31 Identifying a way for derogation, Art. 5.4(a) establishes that those TCNs not fulfilling all those 
conditions but who hold a residence permit or a re-entry visa by one of the member states “shall be 
authorized to enter the territories of the other Member States for transit purposes so that they may reach 
the territory of the Member State which issued the residence permit or re-entry visa”. 
32 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 415/2003 of 27 February 2003 on the issue of visas at the border, 
including the issue of such visas to seamen in transit, OJ L 64/1, 07.03.2003. Art. 1 of the Regulation 
states that “[b]y way of derogation from the general rule that visas shall be issued by diplomatic and 
consular authorities...a third-country national who is required to be in possession of a visa when crossing 
the external borders of the Member States, may exceptionally be issued with a visa at the border”.  8 | CARRERA, GUILD, MERLINO & PARKIN 
 
When assessing the compliance of the Italian measures with the SBC, both France and the 
European Commission have agreed that the temporary residence permits issued by Italy cannot 
grant an automatic right of free movement to the holders, as they will still need to comply with 
the above-mentioned first-entry conditions stipulated in Art. 5 of the SBC.  
It could be argued, however, that these conditions exclusively apply (and therefore can be 
verified by the competent national border/police authorities) at the first point of entry when 
crossing the common external border, and not when exercising the freedom of movement within 
the Schengen area. Thus there should be a legal presumption that those persons crossing the 
internal borders between Italy and France do comply with the rules provided in Art. 5.  
As we point out in section 3, when examining the legality of the reintroduction of internal 
border checks by France, the SBC does allow member countries to exercise “police powers” in 
relation to internal borders as long as they do not amount to systematic checks of equivalent 
effect to the border checks carried out at the common external borders.
33 In our view it is clear 
that EU member states cannot carry out systematic checks at internal border-crossing points in 
order to verify that persons on the move comply with first-entry conditions (on this point see a 
similar position taken by the Court of Justice in section 3 below).  
Art. 5.4(c) of the SBC also emphasizes that TCNs who do not fulfil these conditions of entry 
may be authorized to enter “on humanitarian grounds, on [the] ground of national interest or 
because of international obligations”. The fact that the Italian residence permits have been 
issued for humanitarian considerations may shed light as regards the appropriateness of this last 
provision of the Code and the legality of the right to move by the holders of these permits while 
still not fully complying with the criteria stipulated in Art. 5 of the SBC. This possibility is also 
envisaged in the scope of the Returns Directive (2008/115/EC), which states in Art. 6.4 that 
“Member States may at any moment decide to grant an autonomous residence permit or other 
authorization offering a right to stay for compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons to a third-
country national staying illegally on their territory. In that event no return decision shall be 
issued.”
34  
2.2  Validity of the temporary residence permit 
In view of the above-mentioned DPCM of 5 April 2011, a temporary residence permit for 
humanitarian reasons can be issued to “citizens of North African countries” who entered Italy 
between 1 January and 5 April 2011. The permit is free of charge and lasts for six months. It can 
be used to move freely in the Schengen area together with a travel document – either a passport 
or an ‘alien’s travel document’ issued by the police authorities. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
This exception is nonetheless subject to satisfying certain conditions, including the inability of the TCN 
to apply for a visa in advance and assurance of his or her return to a non-EU country or country of transit. 
33 Still, according to Art. 21(c), the abolition of border controls at the internal borders shall not affect “the 
possibility for a Member State to provide by law for an obligation to hold or carry papers and 
documents”. 
34 Moreover, this provision continues by saying, “[w]here a return decision has already been issued, it 
shall be withdrawn or suspended for the duration of validity of the residence permit or other authorisation 
offering a right to stay”. Refer to Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally 
staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348/98, 24.12.2008. A RACE AGAINST SOLIDARITY: THE SCHENGEN REGIME AND THE FRANCO-ITALIAN AFFAIR | 9 
 
The decree specifies that “socially dangerous persons” or those who had been notified of an 
expulsion order before 1 January 2011 cannot be granted the temporary permit.
35 Despite the 
explanatory note issued by the Italian interior ministry, many doubts remain about the personal 
scope of the measure. First, it is clear that the scope goes beyond those individuals holding 
Tunisian nationality. But which countries fall under the definition of “North African countries”? 
Second, could individuals who arrived in Italy without being stopped and identified by the 
authorities have been granted the permit? If that were the case, how would they prove the date 
of arrival? 
The decree stipulates that “foreigners who have not been issued the residence permit (or to 
whom it has been withdrawn) should be pushed back or expelled”.
36 Individuals who arrived in 
Italy a few hours after midnight on 5 April sadly will fall in this category. It remains difficult to 
understand how the “state of emergency in North Africa” that justified the use of the temporary 
residence permit can cease to exist from that date onwards. 
As stated above, the Commission has not contested the legality of the residence permits per se, 
but rather the granting of an automatic right of free movement in the Schengen area. With 
respect to the validity of the residence permits issued by Schengen member countries under EU 
law, following Art. 34 of the SBC, Italy was required to notify in advance the European 
Commission about the issue of the decree, especially given the potential repercussions that the 
latter could be expected to have on the entire Schengen membership, and most directly for 
neighbouring countries like France. It appears that Italy did comply with this obligation by 
informing the Commission about it. Furthermore, while Italy retains national competence in 
issuing residence permits,
37 the latter must also comply with Decision 2006/688/EC on asylum 
and immigration information exchange. This Decision calls on member states to communicate 
national measures in the area of asylum and immigration “likely to have a significant impact on 
several member states or on the European Union as a whole”.
38 
2.3  The intended public goal 
What was the intended public goal driving the adoption of the decree granting temporary 
residence permits to undocumented North African immigrants from Tunisia? Was the purpose 
to grant humanitarian protection to these individuals for a period during which return to their 
country of origin was not practically possible? Or, was the intention rather a political strategy 
by Italian authorities to force (or plumb the depths of) European solidarity by delivering 
administrative documents encouraging their holders to leave Italy and travel to other Schengen 
countries such as France? 
                                                            
35 The limitations established in Art. 2.2 concern: a) “socially dangerous” persons according to Art. 1 of 
Law No. 27/1956, b) addressees of an expulsion order notified before 1 January 2011, and c) individuals 
denounced for a crime included in Arts. 380-381 of the penal code. 
36 See Art. 2.8. 
37 Yet refer here to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1030/2002 of 13 June 2002 laying down a uniform 
format for residence permits for third-country nationals, OJ L 157/1, 15.06.2002, which stipulates the 
categories of data that must be contained within residence permits issued by member states and the range 
of technical specifications necessary to prevent forgery. See also Art. 2 and the Annex of this Regulation, 
and Council Regulation (EC) No. 380/2008 of 18 April 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1030/2002 
laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals, OJ L 115/1, 29.4.2008. 
38 According to Art. 1, information must be transmitted “as soon as possible, and at the latest when it 
becomes publicly available”. See the Council Decision of 5 October on the establishment of a mutual 
information mechanism concerning Member States’ measures in the areas of asylum and immigration, OJ 
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As stated above, the adoption of the decree first needs to be understood in a national political 
context, in which the Italian ministry of interior has continually raised complaints concerning 
the lack of solidarity of other European countries and Brussels. In addition, Italian politicians 
close to the government have fuelled anti-immigration and xenophobic discourses, justifying the 
implementation of ever-more restrictive policy measures for immigration control. By way of 
illustration, two politicians from Maroni’s anti-immigrant Lega Nord party even suggested that 
weapons should be used in order to protect Italy against “the invasion”.
39 
Beyond the façade of the residence permits for humanitarian protection, the primary goal 
pursued by the Italian authorities has been to promote the mobility of those TCNs holding the 
permits. This was initially made evident by the declarations of the interior minister when he 
presented the decree before the Chamber of Deputies: “A temporary residence permit will be 
given to those migrants who have expressed their intention to go to another EU Member 
State.”
40 Moreover, the real objective of the decree emerges quite transparently when reading 
the text of act, which includes an express reference to the automatic right that it confers to the 
holder to circulate freely in all the EU member states.
41 This goes along with the Italian practice 
of additionally issuing travel documents to those Tunisian immigrants who lacked them.
42  
Can the Italian residence permits entail an automatic right to move freely in the Schengen area? 
The SBC recognizes a right of free movement for everyone in the EU’s Schengen area. While 
EU nationals and their TCN family members acquire this right directly from the provisions of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on citizenship of the Union, 
TCNs in the Union acquire it from those provisions of the EU Treaties dealing with the internal 
market. The SBC places restrictions on this internal market right, limiting the right of TCNs 
resident in any one member state to free movement for a maximum of three months out of any 
six in the territory of other member states. To enjoy this right the TCN must have been admitted 
at the common external frontier in accordance with the SBC and subsequently entitled to move 
from one member state to another for a maximum of three months out of every six (Guild, 
2005). The SBC permits member states to issue residence permits to those who otherwise do not 
meet the requirements for entry at the external borders, but once the residence permit has been 
issued and the member state that issued it has notified the Commission under Art. 34 of the 
SCB, the document has the equivalence of a visa for automatic entry anywhere in the Schengen 
space.  
Yet if indeed the main public goal intended by the decree has been to encourage North African 
immigrants to leave the country, it could be concluded that the decree does stand at odds with 
the principle of sincere and loyal cooperation enshrined in Art. 4.3 of the new version of the 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU), which states that 
                                                            
39 See V. Pop, “Barroso warns of extremism in immigration debate”, EUobserver.com, 14 April 2011 
(http://euobserver.com/22/32181). 
40 See the full speech of the minister on the website of the ministry of interior 
(http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/20/0011_Informativa_Ministro_ 
Lampedusa_Camera.pdf). 
41 Art. 2.3 states that the residence permit allows the holder, who is provided with travel documents, to 
move freely within the EU member states, in conformity with the provisions of the Schengen Agreement 
of 14 July 1995 and of the communitarian law.  
42 For instance, according to a press release, the police office (Questura) in Terni released 79 temporary 
permits together with travel documents. See “Immigrazione: da questura terni 79 permessi soggiorno a 
Tunisini”,  AGI News, 19 April 2011 (http://www.agi.it/perugia/notizie/201104191430-cro-rt10141-
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Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States 
shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from 
the Treaties. 
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain 
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives. 
In the scope of the Schengen regime, and as we have highlighted in section 1 above, this 
principle is of fundamental relevance because of the high degree of mutual trust and close (and 
constant) cooperation that is supposedly required among member states for it to effectively 
function (and continue to be legitimate) in practical terms.
43  
3.  French reintroduction of internal border controls 
In response to the Italian decree and the issue of temporary residence permits, France 
reintroduced internal border checks between the two countries. The controls have materialized 
in the ‘pushing back’ of several hundred immigrants holding the Italian temporary-residence 
permits to Italian territory, and lately also in the blocking of NGO representatives from crossing 
the French-Italian border.  
Although, and as discussed below, France is not the first member state to temporarily reimpose 
internal border controls since the implementation of the Schengen regime at the start of the 
1990s, the significance of the Franco-Italian affair has implications for the principles of 
solidarity and loyal cooperation, along with the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. 
It likewise has a foreign affairs dimension and sends a ‘message abroad’ by the EU on its 
immigration and border policies in the post-revolutionary and war context of the southern 
Mediterranean neighbourhood. 
Similar to the situation in Italy, the French practices are also taking place during a period in 
which the French national government has publicly announced (ahead of regional elections) a 
central policy priority to expel thousands of irregular immigrants from the country. An 
announcement that 25,500 irregular immigrants had been removed from French territory in the 
first three months of 2011
44 preceded the passing of a new immigration law in April 2011, 
which included measures to strengthen the detection, detention and expulsion of undocumented 
migrants.
45 It is against this background of increasingly stringent controls on irregular migration 
that the French government has reiterated in several declarations its refusal to accept 
undocumented immigrants from Tunisia.
46 
                                                            
43 Art. 16 of the SBC on “Cooperation between Member States” notes that “1. The Member States shall 
assist each other and shall maintain close and constant cooperation with a view to the effective 
implementation of border controls, in accordance with Articles 6 to 15. They shall exchange all relevant 
information.” 
44 See the article, « Brice Hortefeux au Figaro: L’immigration illégale doit baisser et elle baissera » on the 
website of the French ministry of interior, 1 April 2011 (http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/ 
a_la_une/toute_l_actualite/immigration/brice-hortefeux-au-figaro-immigration-illegale/view). 
45 See the article, « Adoption par le Sénat, en deuxième lecture, du projet de loi relatif à l’immigration, à 
l’intégration et à la nationalité française », on the website of the French ministry of interior, 14 April 2011 
(http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_la_une/toute_l_actualite/immigration/adoption-senat-projet-loi-
immigration-integration/view).  
46 Refer for instance to the press release of the French ministry of interior, «  Politique migratoire 
européenne – Brice HORTEFEUX : Il n’y a pas d’avenir pour les immigrés clandestins », 24 February 
2011 (http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_la_une/toute_l_actualite/immigration/point-presse-
politique-migratoire-europeenne-rome/view) or the response of Minister of Interior Brice Hortefeux to 
the parliamentary question of Deputy Phillippe Meunier of 17 February 2011. 12 | CARRERA, GUILD, MERLINO & PARKIN 
 
The issue of whether the French practices are consistent with EU border laws, and particularly 
the SBC, needs to be scrutinized from the perspective of the legality of reintroducing internal 
border checks with Italy. One of the core features substantiating (and giving an identity to) the 
Schengen regime is the absence of internal border controls. According to the SBC, the internal 
borders of the Schengen territory may be crossed at any point without a border check on persons 
“irrespective of their nationality”.
47  
The official dismantling of internal frontiers has gone hand in hand with the creation and further 
consolidation of the principle of free movement of persons, which is now stipulated in Arts. 
67.2 and 77 TFEU and is recognized as a fundamental right in Art. 45 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.
48 
This general rule of free movement has nonetheless been accompanied by several exceptions 
and derogative clauses in the hands of EU member state authorities. The SBC still permits the 
exercise of some “police powers” by competent national authorities in relation to “checks within 
the territory”, as long as this exercise “does not have an effect equivalent to border checks”
49 
and the checks “do not have border control as their objective”.
50 These police powers must not 
constitute systematic border checks either and should be carried out on the basis of ‘spot-
checks’.
51 
The limits of the exercise of police powers by France when implementing the SBC were (by 
coincidence) subject to a recent ruling by the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. In the Melki case 
(C-188/10),
52 the contested measure was French national legislation allowing policy authorities, 
within an area of 20 km from the land border of a Schengen member state, to check the identity 
of any person not ‘at the borders’ but rather circulating within its national territory. The Court 
ruled against France and considered these police checks disguised border controls. The Court 
held that the SBC precludes  
national legislation which grants to the police authorities of the Member States in 
question the power to check, solely within an area of 20 km from the land border of 
that State…, the identity of any person, irrespective of his behaviour and of specific 
circumstances giving rise to a risk of breach of public order, in order to ascertain 
whether the obligations laid down by law to hold, carry and produce papers and 
documents are fulfilled, where that legislation does not provide the necessary 
framework for that power to guarantee that its practical exercise cannot have an effect 
equivalent to border checks.
53 
It is evident that the French practices in the Franco-Italian affair go beyond sporadic police 
controls within the French territory or ‘spot-checks’ at the border with Italy. They rather 
constitute a systematic reintroduction of internal border checks with Italy, whose main objective 
is border control at the French-Italian border of Tunisian immigrants holding the Italian 
temporary-residence permit.  
                                                            
47 See Art. 20 of the SBC. 
48 Art. 45 of the EU Charter states that “1. Every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States. 2. Freedom of movement and residence may be granted, 
in accordance with the Treaties, to nationals of third countries legally resident in the territory of a 
Member State.” 
49 See Art. 21(a) SBC. 
50 Ibid., paragraph (i) SBC. 
51 Ibid., paragraphs (iii) and (iv) SBC. 
52 Court of Justice, Joined Cases C-188/10 Aziz Meki and C-189/10 Sélim Abdeli, 22 June 2010.  
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Concerning the possibilities conferred by the SBC to national authorities to derogate from the 
general rule of freedom of movement, the Code does in fact offer the possibility to member 
states to reintroduce border controls “exceptionally” at internal borders, subject to a number of 
rules provided in Arts. 23-31. The temporary reintroduction of border controls is justified in 
those situations where “there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security…[and for] 
no more than 30 days or for the foreseeable duration of the serious threat if its duration exceeds 
the period of 30 days”.
54  
Art. 24 of the SBC provides for the procedure to be applied for “foreseeable events”. Art. 25 
confers the possibility to Schengen member states to “exceptionally and immediately 
reintroduce border control[s] at internal borders” in those cases where considerations of public 
policy or internal security call for “urgent action”. 
As the appendix to this paper illustrates, the reintroduction of internal border controls in the 
Schengen territory is not peculiar to the Franco-Italian affair. Since the beginning of the 1990s, 
several EU member states have introduced internal border controls, for instance during large-
scale sporting events as in the case of Germany for the 2006 football World Cup, and for 
international political meetings, including Italy’s reinstatement of border checks during the 
2009 G8 summit in L’Aquila.
55 While sensitive political demonstrations, ‘terrorist threats’ and 
ceremonies of national importance have all been cited as grounds for reimposing border 
controls, only a small handful of cases since the 1990s have been linked to the desire to restrict 
the immigration of TCNs (Groenendijk, 2004).
56  
It is striking to note that one such incident that occurred at the same place along the French-
Italian border (Ventimiglia) bears a strong resemblance to the recent Franco-Italian affair. In 
March 1999 France closed the border to prevent the entry of large numbers of Italians and 
Albanians arriving by train with the aim of participating in a demonstration in Paris to support 
undocumented migrants. In this case, however, the French actions did not provoke the political 
tensions observed recently. Indeed, it is surprising that the Franco-Italian affair of April 2011 
provides only the second example in the history of Schengen whereby the temporary 
reintroduction of border controls has elicited a negative response from another member state.
57 
That notwithstanding, and as the SBC expressly states, “in an area where persons may move 
freely, the reintroduction of border controls at internal borders should remain an exception”.
58 
The legality of the French border practices needs to be determined with respect to compliance 
with the criteria established by the SBC on the exceptional reintroduction of systematic, internal 
border checks, especially in relation to the following four factors: i) public policy and state-of-
emergency considerations; ii) the principle of proportionality; iii) procedural requirements; and 
iv) fundamental rights and non-discrimination. 
                                                            
54 See Art. 23(1) SBC; moreover, in accordance with Art. 23(2),  
[i]f the serious threat to public policy or internal security persists beyond the period provided 
for in paragraph 1, the Member State may prolong border control[s] on the same grounds as 
those referred to in paragraph 1 and, taking into account any new elements, for renewable 
periods of up to 30 days, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 26. 
55 See European Commission, Report on the application of Title III (Internal Borders) of Regulation (EC) 
No. 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across 
borders (Schengen Borders Code), COM(2010) 554 final, Brussels, 13 October 2010. 
56 Refer to the appendix of this paper. 
57 The only other occasion stemmed from France’s refusal to lift its internal border controls in 1995, 
owing to its concerns about Dutch policy on drugs. 
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3.1  Public policy and the politics of emergency 
The first factor to be examined is the appropriateness of the French view of the case as one 
requiring “urgent and immediate action”, as well as that of classifying it as a “serious threat to 
public policy and internal security”. Can the actual volumes of migratory flows at stake and the 
nature of the planned demonstration by civil society representatives be considered threats to 
public policy or internal security and in need of emergency action?  
How many immigrants are we talking about? In 2011 fewer than 28,000 persons have landed in 
Italy, among whom 23,000 are Tunisians and 4,680 are asylum seekers from Libya.
59 According 
to information provided by the media, the total number of immigrants subject to the French 
border controls have been a few hundred – no more than 400 individuals. When comparing this 
data with, for instance, the total number of entries by non-EU nationals across the common EU 
external borders through airports and other borders, the amount is insignificant.  
Based on data gathered by the Council of the European Union, in one-week’s time the total 
number of entries (external border crossings) through the EU external borders is 1,955,178!
60 
When looking at these statistics on a yearly basis, and being aware of the caveats involved in 
making such calculations, it could be estimated that around 61 million TCNs with no visa and 
44 million TCNs with visas entered the EU in 2009. This would amount to a total of 
approximately 105 million entries by TCNs during 2009.  
Indeed, as the statistics offered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR, 2011) reveal, the real ‘emergency’ has been that taking place not in Europe but rather 
on the other side of the Mediterranean, where 550,680 persons moved from Libya to 
neighbouring countries (and almost half of them went to Tunisia). 
Doubts concerning the extent to which the migratory flows from Italy could constitute a 
“serious threat to public policy” for France were also raised by Commissioner for Home Affairs 
Cecilia Malmström, at her press briefing on 1 April 2011.
61 Following her visit to Tunisia, the 
Commissioner answered in the following manner the question of whether the French authorities 
were entitled to send people back to Italy: “There are no borders so they can’t. Schengen is 
there so you are not allowed to do checks at the border. Because there is Schengen, [internal 
border controls] can only be evoked if there is a serious threat to public security and for the 
moment that is not the case, so in principle no.” 
The low number of entries from North Africa to Italy, and even more so those from Italy to 
France, justify the non-application of the EU Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC).
62 
This Directive, which has not been used since its adoption, provides common minimum 
standards “for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons 
                                                            
59 See the declaration by Interior Minister Roberto Maroni of 12 April 2011 on the website of the Italian 
ministry of interior (http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/ 
notizie/immigrazione/000065_2011_04_12_Audizione_Maroni_Commissione_Camera.html). 
60 Council of the European Union, Results of the Data Collection Exercise, 13267/09, Brussels, 22 
September 2009. 
61 Refer to the statement by Commissioner Malmström following her visit to Tunisia, in the European 
Commission Midday Press Briefing of 1 April 2011 (http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/ 
player/streaming.cfm?type=ebsvod&sid=177156).  
62 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection 
in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts 
between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, OJ L 212/12, 
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from third countries”.
63 The main reason it has not been applied is that so far the numbers of 
displaced persons coming from North Africa to the EU have not been large enough for the 
situation to be considered a “mass influx”.  
The French minister of interior was said to have taken the decision to suspend train services on 
the basis of a request by the police chief of the Alpes-Maritime, who cited “risques de trouble 
manifeste a l’ordre public”.
64 Here the French authorities appear to take a wide interpretation of 
(intentions of) civil disobedience or public disorder. Flyers circulated on the Internet ahead of 
the event, dubbed the ‘Train of Dignity’, called on French and Italian human rights activists, 
lawyers and media representatives to board the train from Ventimiglia in order to “accompany 
and protect” migrants as they crossed the French-Italian border.
65 The demonstration, primarily 
organized by the association ‘Ya Basta’, a network of Italian pro-immigrant rights 
organizations, also called on activists to form “welcome groups” to meet migrants as they 
arrived in Nice and Marseille.
66 Ultimately, the event gathered 200-300 French and Italian 
demonstrators to accompany 60-100 Tunisian immigrants. Upon the suspension of train 
services, the demonstrators attempted to march to the French consulate but were blocked by riot 
police. There were no reports of violence during the episode.
67 
While France holds a certain margin of discretion to determine what constitutes ‘public policy’, 
French authorities are not completely free to put into practice any interpretation of this concept. 
The proportionality test, which we discuss in the next subsection, closely applies in this respect 
as well. Furthermore, the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon implies an expansion of the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in Luxembourg to rule on public order measures/exceptions 
by member states concerning checks on persons at internal borders.
68 
3.2 Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality is of especial relevance when testing the adequacy, suitability 
and necessity of the French measures. Art. 23.1 of the SBC provides that “[t]he scope and 
duration of the temporary reintroduction of border control[s] at internal borders shall not exceed 
what is strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat”. (Emphasis added.) 
                                                            
63 Art. 2(a) clarifies that this will be the case especially if “there is also a risk that the asylum system will 
be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for its efficient operation, in the interests of the 
persons concerned and other persons requesting protection”. 
64 See the article « Train bloqué à Vintimille: l’UE conforte la décision de Paris », Le Figaro, 18 April 
2011 (http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2011/04/18/01003-20110418ARTFIG00444-train-bloque-a-
vintimille-l-ue-conforte-la-decision-de-paris.php). 
65  See for instance the website ‘Citoyens des Deux Rives’, 
http://www.citoyensdesdeuxrives.eu/better/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2189:le-
17-avril--genes--vintimille--marseille--train-de-la-dignite&catid=59:agenda&Itemid=94  
66 See the website ‘Ya Basta’ (http://www.yabasta.it/spip.php?article1510&var_recherche 
=train%20dignite). 
67 A. Coppola, “French Border Police Block Italian Trains”, Corriere della Sera, 18 April 2011 
(http://www.corriere.it/International/english/articoli/2011/04/18/coppola-french-block-italian-migrants-
trains.html). 
68 Art. 68.2 of the former Treaty Establishing the European Community had stated that “[i]n any event, 
the Court of Justice shall not have jurisdiction to rule [on] any measure or decision taken pursuant to 
Article 62.1 relating to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security”. 
Moreover, Art. 5.1 of the Directive adds that “[t]he existence of a mass influx of displaced persons shall 
be established by a Council Decision adopted by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, 
which shall also examine any request by a Member State that it submit a proposal to the Council”. 16 | CARRERA, GUILD, MERLINO & PARKIN 
 
Here again, it is far from evident the extent to which the movement of a few hundred people and 
the planned demonstration by NGO representatives could actually constitute a “serious threat” 
to France’s public policy and internal security. Nor is it obvious that the systematic 
reintroduction of internal border controls on human movement from Italy was “strictly 
necessary” or whether there were other less restrictive (and onerous) options for the persons 
involved. A similar position concerning the disproportionate attention and concern raised by this 
affair was expressed by European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, when he declared 
that “of course there’s a risk of migration, but we must not exaggerate it”.
69 Warnings against 
inflating the scale of the migration have been echoed by Commissioner Cecilia Malmström.
70 
The note delivered by the French ministry of interior on 6 April 2011
71 argued that the 
reintroduction of border checks was based on the fact that the permit holders failed to meet the 
following conditions: first, being in possession of a valid travel document; second, being a 
holder of a valid residence permit notified by the issuing member state to the European 
Commission; third, having sufficient means of subsistence; and fourth, not being considered a 
threat to public policy and internal security. Among these requirements, that related to the 
financial means of subsistence has been of particular relevance for the French authorities.  
According to some media reports, it appears that the financial subsistence condition is being 
applied at the French Italian border, with police demanding that holders of the Italian 
temporary-residence permit prove that they have €31 per day (a total of around €900 a month) 
for their entry into French territory.
72 The concordance of this requirement with proportionality 
is also questionable. Does the SBC allow all Schengen members to apply different thresholds of 
financial coverage? We are of the opinion that this financial requirement is not lawful if Italy 
properly notified the European Commission about the issue of the temporary residence permits 
in accordance with Art. 34 of the SBC (see subsection 2.2 above).  
3.3 Procedural  requirements 
The reintroduction of internal border checks equally needs to comply with a number of 
procedural requirements. In accordance with Art. 25.2 of the SBC, France was under the 
obligation to notify the other EU member states and the European Commission “without delay” 
about the reintroduction of internal border checks “requiring urgent action” and to supply “the 
reasons justifying the use of this procedure”. More specifically, the French authorities needed to 
provide the following information: the reasons for the reintroduction (giving details of the 
                                                            
69 Quoted in V. Pop, “Franco-Italian row over Tunisian migrants escalates”, EUobserver.com, 18 April 
2011 (http://euobserver.com/?aid=32199). 
70 See F. Ewers, M. von Rohr and C. Schult, “Refugee Influx Exposes Limitations of European 
Solidarity”,  Spiegel Online, 23 April 2011 (http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ 
0,1518,757666,00.html). 
Refer also to the previous version of the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of 
the European Union, which was added by the Amsterdam Treaty and which stipulated in Art. 2.1 that 
“[i]n any event, the Court of Justice shall have no jurisdiction on measures or decisions relating to the 
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security”. It is interesting to note that it 
was on the initiative of France that Art. 68.2 was introduced during the negotiations of the Amsterdam 
Treaty.  
71 Ministére de l’interieur, de l’outre-mer, des collectivitités territoriales et de l’immigration, 
Autorisations de séjour délivrées à ressortissants de pays tiers par les Etats membres de Schengen, 6 avril 
2011 (http://www.interieur.gouv.fr). 
72 See for example, “Migrant spat puts strain on EU open borders”, France24.com, 23 April 2011 
(http://mobile.france24.com/en/20110419-tunisia-migrant-train-blockade-comes-under-legal-attack-
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events said to constitute “a serious threat to public policy or internal security”), its scope and the 
names of authorized crossing points, as well as its date and duration.
73  
France (or the Council) is also under the obligation to inform the European Parliament “as soon 
as possible of the measures taken”.
74 The French authorities will be required to present a report 
on the reintroduction of the border controls before the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission outlining “the operation of the checks and the effectiveness of the reintroduction of 
border control[s]”.
75  
It is at present difficult to determine the extent to which France has complied with all these 
procedural steps, a majority of which are deemed central from the perspective of accountability 
and democratic scrutiny of the national measures derogating the principle of free movement of 
persons. The European Commission has declared that France is intending to send an official 
letter providing this information, which in principle will not be made public.
76  
3.4 Fundamental  rights,  non-discrimination and administrative 
guarantees 
The border checks carried out by the French authorities at Ventimiglia have mainly targeted 
undocumented North African immigrants from Tunisia holding an Italian temporary-residence 
permit. The compatibility of this kind of control with the principle of non-discrimination 
constitutes another issue of concern from a legal point of view. The SBC highlights a number of 
obligations that national border guards must fulfil in the performance of their duties in the 
implementation of the SBC. In particular, Art. 6 of the Code (on the conduct of border checks) 
stipulates that  
1. Border guards shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human 
dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate 
to the objectives pursued by such measures. 
2. While carrying out border checks, border guards shall not discriminate against 
persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation.
77 
The focus on this specific category of immigrants and the presumption that only they do not 
comply with the set of first-entry conditions (especially that of financial subsistence) stipulated 
in Art. 5 of the SBC reveals a tension between the French border practices and the principle of 
non-discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, which is also enshrined in the EU 
Treaties, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and secondary legislation.
78 
                                                            
73 According to Art. 24 of the SBC, “Member States may even prolong border control at internal borders 
after having notified the Commission and the other member states”. See also Art. 26 of the SBC.  
74 See Art. 27 of the SBC.  
75 Refer to Art. 29 of the SBC.  
76 According to Art. 31 of the SBC, “[a]t the request of the Member State concerned, the other Member 
States, the European Parliament and the Commission shall respect the confidentiality of the information 
supplied in connection with the reintroduction and prolongation of border controls”.  
77 Refer also to Recital 7 of the SBC, which states that “[b]order checks should be carried out in such a 
way as to fully respect human dignity. Border control should be carried out in a professional and 
respectful manner and be proportionate to the objectives pursued.” 
78 See Art. 19 TFEU and Art. 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 
83/02, 30.03.2010; see also paragraph 31 of the Preamble to Directive 2004/38/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ L 158/77, 30.04.2004.  18 | CARRERA, GUILD, MERLINO & PARKIN 
 
Furthermore, any assessment of the legality of the French reintroduction of internal border 
controls and the Italian decree granting temporary residence permits should not distract our 
attention from the impact of these national measures and practices on the fundamental rights 
(e.g. human dignity) and freedoms of those targeted by coercive measures – especially given the 
humanitarian considerations underlying their migratory background.  
It is to be hoped that the French border checks have complied with the set of administrative 
guarantees envisaged by the SBC in the treatment of TCNs when refusing entry. Art. 13 of the 
SBC sets out the following obligations for national authorities in refusing entry: first, the issue 
of a substantiated decision stating the precise reasons for refusal in a standard form; and second, 
the right to lodge an appeal (which shall have no suspensive effect on the decision to refuse 
entry), along with a written indication of the contact points able to provide information or 
representatives competent to act on the individual’s behalf.
79 
Nor should we forget the repercussions of the French measures on the rights and freedoms of 
the representatives from civil society groups who accompanied the migrants on the trains 
blocked by the French authorities during the events of 17 April 2011, and especially their rights 
to freedom of movement and freedom of assembly and demonstration as enshrined in Art. 12 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. As noted above, the planned demonstration was of a 
peaceful nature and might be difficult to categorize as a threat to public policy and public 
security. Indeed, following the event, France’s primary justification for blocking the 
demonstration was that it had not been declared and authorized by the authorities in advance.
80 
4.  A race against solidarity: Conclusions 
This paper has tested the legality of actions taken in the Franco-Italian affair with respect to the 
Schengen regime and has found that neither Italy nor France are exempted from difficulties in 
justifying the compliance of their national measures and practices with EU border law and the 
general principles of the Schengen regime. The actions of both countries raise several concerns 
from the viewpoint of EU law and their obligations under the SBC. 
As regards the temporary residence permits issued by Italy for humanitarian considerations, we 
have argued that their lawfulness depends not on the systematic verification of the conditions of 
first entry through the common external borders (such as that of sufficient financial resources 
for subsistence), but rather on their compliance with the principle of sincere and loyal 
cooperation. Their legality is conditioned upon the extent to which the intended public goal of 
the Italian decree has been to offer proper humanitarian protection and access to fundamental 
rights to those Tunisian immigrants who cannot be returned to their country of origin, and not to 
force ‘European solidarity’ through the back door by encouraging them to leave the country and 
exercise freedom of movement to other Schengen states.  
It is evident in our view, however, in light of the political discourses backing up the enactment 
of the decree and the emphasis given by its wording to the granting of an automatic right to 
move elsewhere in the EU, that the decree constitutes a violation of the principle of sincere and 
loyal cooperation. 
                                                            
79 Art. 13.2 of the SBC continues by saying that “[w]ithout prejudice to any compensation granted in 
accordance with national law, the third-country national concerned shall, where the appeal concludes that 
the decision to refuse entry was ill-founded, be entitled to correction of the cancelled entry stamp, and 
any other cancelations or additions which have been made, by the Member State which refused entry”. 
80 See « Regain de tension entre Rome et Paris au sujet d’un train d’immigrés tunisiens », France24.com, 
18 April 2011 (http://www.france24.com/fr/20110417-italie-france-immigration-clandestine-tunisie-train-
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Concerning the reintroduction of internal border controls by France, in our assessment the 
French authorities have practised systematic border checks targeting those North African 
immigrants holding the residence permits granted by Italy since the adoption of the decree in the 
first week of April. We have doubts as to whether this migratory flow and the planned 
demonstration in Ventimiglia provide appropriate grounds for France to label them as serious 
threats to public order and internal security, given the volume of human movement (a few 
hundred persons) and the pacific nature of the planned demonstration supporting the claims of 
immigrants. France would also have difficulties in properly justifying the urgency of the 
situation in order to use the emergency procedure envisaged by the SBC for the reintroduction 
of border checks..  
The relation between the French measures and the principle of proportionality is also a difficult 
one. The kinds of border checks that have been carried out appear to us to be disproportionate 
and exaggerated when considering the actual nature of the events. It remains to be seen how 
France will provide convincing grounds for defending their ‘strict necessity’ or whether there 
could have been other less restrictive and intrusive options for the freedom of movement and 
access to solidarity by the persons involved.  
The reimposition by France of internal border controls can be said to amount to an excessive 
burden upon a fundamental EU right and freedom, i.e. the free movement of persons, which 
should always prevail as the general rule over the application of very well justified exceptions 
by EU member state authorities. 
Sadly, the French practices also send a clear message concerning the lack of solidarity, not only 
with respect to its neighbour Italy, but also and perhaps more importantly towards the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of those North African immigrants who are holders of Italian 
administrative documents and who seek to exercise their legitimate right of freedom of 
movement in the Schengen territory. A similar message is also being sent by the French 
authorities abroad to the countries and populations of the North African states in the midst of 
democratic reform or war. The targeting of the border checks against this particular group of 
people is problematic in relation to the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of ethnic 
origin and nationality as well as the administrative guarantees envisaged by the SCB for the 
conduct of border guards while carrying out border checks. 
The Franco-Italian affair therefore reveals a rather shameful ‘race to the bottom’ by two 
Schengen members (one of which belonged to the original five Schengen members, i.e. France) 
as regards the principles of solidarity, mutual respect, loyal cooperation and fundamental rights 
protection. One would not expect these sorts of policies 25 years after the kick-off of Schengen. 
It is not just the legal commitments of both EU member states that are at stake in this case, but 
also the overall consistency and legitimacy of Europe’s migration policy, both internally and 
abroad. 
The democratic uprisings in the North African states and the subsequent war in Libya should 
instead constitute a unique opportunity for all Schengen member states and the EU as a whole to 
develop common policy responses that put solidly into practice the principles of solidarity and 
the fair sharing of responsibility in migratory policy affairs. The entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon has provided that opportunity by positioning these principles at the heart of the common 
EU immigration, asylum and border policies. Notably, Art. 80 of the TFEU now stipulates that  
[t]he policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be 
governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its 
financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts 20 | CARRERA, GUILD, MERLINO & PARKIN 
 
adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this 
principle.
81  
It is time for the EU and its member states to give practical shape to the principle and notion of 
‘solidarity’ beyond formalistic political statements and nice words. While the EU Treaties do 
not provide a definition of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, nor of their goals or 
fundamentals (Vanheule et al., 2011), it is in our view central that their development should 
broadly transcend strengthening border controls and FRONTEX (the EU Border Agency), 
support in the return of undocumented immigrants and EU funding resources. The Franco-
Italian affair (yet again) shows how ineffective and counterproductive security (border control)-
focused measures and restrictive immigration policies are with respect to dealing with the 
management of human flows in way that fully complies with EU basic, general principles.  
Freedom of movement and labour immigration should not be seen as ‘a burden to share’ for the 
EU and its member states, but rather as an opportunity for all the parties involved. A wider and 
multidimensional understanding of solidarity needs to encompass the consolidation and further 
development of a common EU labour immigration policy, which would be coherent with 
Europe’s labour market needs and competitiveness. Such a policy should be driven by a rights- 
and fair treatment-based approach, ensuring openness, flexibility, compatibility with other 
policies (such as employment, non-discrimination and social inclusion) and effectiveness 
(Carrera et al., 2011).
82 
National measures and practices such as those witnessed between France and Italy undermine 
basic legal rules and principles of the EU’s AFSJ and the Schengen regime. They also exert 
negative repercussions on the EU’s relations with the non-EU countries whose nationals are 
being subject to repressive immigration policies and discourses at various governance levels, 
and more widely with Africa.  
The European Commission should therefore react more strongly and ‘on time’ – by making 
swift use of current enforcement mechanisms for non-compliance with EU law and potentially 
devising new ones ensuring an automatic suspensive effect of contested national measures 
having an impact on European fundamental freedoms and rights (Carrera and Atger, 2010) – 
when disputes take place, such as those occurring at the Franco-Italian border. It should show 
stronger leadership and a communication strategy against populist and nationalist anti-
immigration rhetoric (policies and practices) by European leaders. The promotion and scrutiny 
of the proper implementation of existing standards on fundamental human rights in other 
international and regional arenas across the EU member states should become a central priority. 
The EU should devise an appropriate monitoring system, ensuring the daily implementation of 
European border laws (and their compliance with fundamental rights and EU freedoms) across 
common external borders (air, land and sea), and meeting the principles of impartiality, 
objectivity and transparency (Carrera, 2010). The European Parliament should also be 
immediately and fully informed about all the details of such cases by the relevant parties 
involved, to ensure full democratic scrutiny and accountability. 
The current version of the Schengen system as outlined by the 2006 SBC must not be revised 
following the nationalistic and opportunistic goals expressed by the French and Italian 
                                                            
81 Refer also to Art. 2 of the TEU, which identifies solidarity as one of the key values of the EU, and Art. 
3.3 TEU, which stipulates that the EU “shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and 
solidarity among Member States”. 
82 This would also be in line with Art. 67.2 TFEU, which calls for the development of a common 
immigration policy “based on solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third country 
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governments in their bilateral meeting of 26 April 2011.
83As an outcome of that summit, Silvio 
Berlusconi and Nicolas Sarkozy issued a joint letter to Herman Van Rompuy and European 
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, calling for the upcoming June 2011 European 
Council to examine new measures to reinforce ‘security’ in Schengen, such as “the possibility to 
temporarily re-establish internal border controls in case of exceptional difficulties in the 
management of common external borders”.
84 
This proposal is surprising. As discussed in this paper, the SBC already envisages the possibility 
for a member state to temporarily reintroduce internal border controls in cases where “there is a 
serious threat to public policy or internal security”. This possibility, however, is an ‘exception’ 
in the hands of national authorities and it is firmly subject to a number of procedural 
requirements and subject to the principles of proportionality, solidarity, accountability and 
fundamental rights. A new legislative reform exclusively destined to widen (even further) the 
room for manoeuvre by EU member state governments to abolish the current Schengen rules 
and the principle of freedom of movement (and evade their current legal commitments) would 
not just contravene these basic rule of law principles, and more generally, the EU Treaties. Such 
legislative reform would also constitute a major step backwards in European integration, the 
very foundations of Schengen and the principle of free movement, which has been correctly 
considered one of the “great success stories of the EU” (Groenendijk, 2009). It would also 
represent a strengthening of ‘intergovernmentalism’ in an area that currently falls under EU 
competence/law and endanger the sustainability of the EU’s AFSJ and the internal market.  
As demonstrated in this paper, this affair not only concerns a formalistic ‘legal check’ of the 
application of one of the main components and general principles of the EU’s AFSJ, the SBC, 
but also has major implications for the fundamental rights and freedoms of many individuals in 
Europe as enshrined in the Treaties and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. It is the very 
legitimacy of one of the EU’s political cornerstones that is at stake when EU member states 
engage in a race to the bottom in migration and border control standards.  
 
                                                            
83 See the articles “Berlusconi and Sarkozy to seek tightening of EU border controls”, EUobserver.com, 
26 April 2011 (http://euobserver.com/9/32229) and “Sarkozy, Berlusconi to propose Schengen 
‘upgrade’”,  Euractiv.com, 26 April 2011 (http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/sarkozy-berlusconi-
propose-schengen-upgrade-news-504292). 
84 The full text of the joint letter is available from the website of the Italian ministry of foreign affairs 
(http://www.esteri.it/MAE/IT/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Approfondimenti/2011/04/20110426_ItaliaF
rancia.htm).  
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Appendix. Reintroduction of internal border controls 
Methodological note  
There is no systematic, official EU record of all instances involving the temporary reinstatement 
of internal border controls since 1995. Consequently, Table A1 is not exhaustive but aims at 
demonstrating, through the data available, a general overview of the member states involved 
and the grounds invoked when internal border controls have been temporarily reintroduced over 
the past 15 years. 
Entries occurring from October 2006 onwards (since the entry into force of the Schengen 
Borders Code) are complete and are taken from the European Commission’s Report on the 
application of Title III (Internal Borders) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen 
Borders Code).
85  
Entries occurring between January 2000 and June 2003 are taken from the Statewatch European 
Monitor.
86 The sources of all other entries are provided in the table or table notes, and are 
primarily derived from the individual, ad hoc notifications available in the public register of 
Council documents. Justifications relating to immigration control objectives are shown in green 
shading, and those relating (explicitly) to political activism/organized demonstrations are in 
blue. 
Table A1. Instances of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders 
between 1995 and 2011  
Member state  Duration  Justification 
Netherlands  March 1995–December 1995  Construction activities at Schiphol airport 
obstructing separate handling of Schengen and non-
Schengen passengers (cited in Groenendijk, 2004, p. 
158) 
France July  1995–1998  (approximate)  Concerns about Dutch policy on drugs caused France 
to delay its lifting of internal border controls 
a) 
France  March 1999   Demonstration in support of undocumented 
immigrants in Paris (controls reinstated at French–
Italian border to prevent the crossing of Albanians 
and Italians to participate in the demonstration) 
(cited in Groenendijk, 2004, p. 158) 
Netherlands  April 1997  Demonstrations of Kurdish and Turkish immigrants 
in Germany (concerns about violence spreading 
across the Dutch-German border) (cited in 
Groenendijk, 2004, p. 158) 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
June 2000  European Football Championship, Euro 2000 (cited 
in Groenendijk, 2004, p. 158) 
Belgium  10–31 January 2000  Immigrant regularization programme 
Luxembourg  Not specified  Belgian restoration of border checks 
Germany  7–12 July 2000  Visit of the Iranian President Mohammed Khatami 
                                                            
85 See European Commission, COM(2010) 554 final, Brussels, 13 October 2010. 
86 More specifically, see the Statewatch European Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 4, February 2003. 24 | CARRERA, GUILD, MERLINO & PARKIN 
 
Table A1. cont’d 
France  10–14 October 2000  Biarritz European Council meeting, 12–14 October 
2000 
Spain  11–14 October 2000  Biarritz European Council meeting, 12–14 October 
2000 
Luxembourg  25–29 November 2000  Visit of Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar from 
Spain, 28–29 November 2000 
France 2–10  December  2000  Nice European Council, 7–8 December 2000 
Belgium  26 December 2000–10 January 
2001 
Risk of a sudden, temporary increase in asylum 
seekers owing to new asylum restrictions from 10 
January 2001 
Austria  25 June–3 July 2001  European economic summit, Salzburg, 1–3 July 
2001 
Sweden  15–16 June 2001  European summit, Gothenburg, 15–16 June 2001 
Italy  14–21 July 2001  G8 meeting, Genoa, 20–22 July 2001 
Norway  5–12 December 2001  Nobel prize ceremony, including Palestinian leader 
Yassar Arafat and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Oslo 
Spain  30 January–4 February 2002  Events scheduled by the Spanish presidency 
Iceland  1 February 2002  Checks among passengers on two planes from 
Copenhagen for members of a suspected organized 
crime group 
Austria 11–13  March  2002  Visit of the Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, 
11–13 March 2002 
Spain  9–18 March 2002  Barcelona European Council meeting 
Spain  21–23 March 2002  Informal meeting of EU defence ministers, Zaragoza 
Iceland  7–16 May 2002  NATO meeting in Reykjavik, 14–15 May 2002 
Spain  14–22 June 2002  EU summit, Seville, 21–22 June 2002 
Norway  15–27 June 2002  World Bank Conference, Oslo, 24–26 June 2002 
Austria  9–17 September 2002  European economic summit, 15–17 September 2002 
France  19 October 2002  Batasuna meeting/rally, Bayonne (Pyrenees) 
Italy  1–10 November 2002  European Social Forum, Florence 
Denmark   6–12 December 2002  Copenhagen European Council, 12–13 December 
2002 
Sweden  6–14 December 2002  Copenhagen European Council, 12–13 December 
2002 
Spain  20 December 2002–7 January 
2003 
Movement of eminent persons during the Christmas 
holidays to the area of the Arán Valley (Lleida) 
France  22 May–3 June 2003  Summit of heads of state or government of the 
G8 member states, Evian-les-Bains, 1–3 June 2003 
France 1–8  June  2004  Ceremonies marking the 60
th anniversary of the D-
Day landings 
b) 
Spain  15–24 May 2004  Wedding of Prince Felipe 
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Table A1. cont’d 
Portugal  26 May–4 July 2004  Music festival “Rock in Rio” and the European 
Football Championship, Euro 2004 
d) 
France  9 July–9 August 2005 
(Prolonged for successive one 
month periods until 9 February 
2006)  
Concern over potential terrorist attacks following the 
London bombings of 7 July 2005 
e) and attempted 
terrorist bombings in London on 21 July 2005 
f) 
Finland  16 August–14 August 2005  World Championship in Athletics held in Helsinki 
Spain  25–29 November 2005  Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean summit of 26–28 
November 2005 
g) 
France  9 February–28 February 2006  Olympic games in Turin 
Spain  25 February 2006  Demonstration by Batasuna in Cibourne (France) 
h) 
France 9–12  May  2006  Conference of Western Mediterranean Ministers of 
the Interior, Nice, 11–12 May 2006 
i) 
Germany  1 June–10 July 2006  2006 Football World Cup 
j) 
Finland  25 August–12 September 2006  ASEM summit, Helsinki, 10–11 September 2006 
k) 
France  21 October 2006  Youth Days of radical young Basques in Saint Pée-
sur-Nivelle and demonstration organized in Bayonne 
by the support committee of Philippe Bidart 
Finland  9–21 October 2006  Informal meeting of heads of states and government, 
Lahti 
Finland  13–29 November 2006  EUROMED meeting, Tampere 
France  12–16 February 2007  Conference of heads of states of Africa and France, 
Cannes, 13–16 February 2007 
Germany  25 May–9 June 2007  G8 summit in Heiligendamm/Mecklenburg Western 
Pomerania, 6–8 June 2007 
Iceland 2–3  November  2007  Participation of MC Hells Angels at the inauguration 
of the Icelandic Motorcycle club, Reykjavik, 1–4 
November 2007 
Austria  2 June–1 July 2008  European Football Championship Euro 2008  
France  27 September 2008  Demonstration on 27 September at 16:00 in 
Bayonne, supervised by Batasuna 
Finland  24 November–5 December 
2008 
Meeting of OSCE Council of Ministers, Helsinki, 4–
5 December 2008 
Iceland  5–7 March 2009  Visit of MC Hells Angels to the Icelandic 
Motorcycle club, Reykjavik 
Germany  20 March–5 April 2009  NATO summit in Strasbourg, Baden-Baden and 
Kehl, 3–4 April 2009 
France  30 March–5 April 2009  NATO summit, Strasbourg, 3–4 April 2009 
Italy  28 June–15 July 2009  G8 summit, L’Aquila, 10–12 July 2009 
France  19 September 2009  Demonstration by Batasuna in Bayonne 26 | CARRERA, GUILD, MERLINO & PARKIN 
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Spain  26–27 September 2009  Celebration of ‘Basque Warrior Day’ in the Basque 
Country and Navarra (ES) and in Pyrénées-
Orientales (FR) 
France  27 September 2009  50
th anniversary of ETA 
Norway  27 November 2009–12 
December 2009 
Nobel Peace Prize ceremony, Oslo, 10 December 
2009 
Denmark  1–18 December 2009  UN Climate Change Conference, Copenhagen, 7–18 
December 2009 
Malta  5–18 April 2010  Visit of Pope Benedict XVI, 17–18 April 2010 
Estonia 17–23  April  2010  Informal meeting of NATO foreign ministers, 
Tallinn, 22–23 April 2010 
France  28 May–2 June 2010  Franco-African summit, Nice, 31 May–1 June 2010 
Latvia  24 May–1 June 2010  NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Riga, 28 May–1 
June 2010 
Portugal  16–20 November 2010  NATO summit, Lisbon, 19–20 November 2010 
 
Justification relating to immigration control objectives 
 
Justification relating (explicitly) to political activism/organized demonstrations  
 
a) Schengen Annual Report 1996, SCH/C (97) 22; Council document 19846/1/99 REV 1. 
b) Council of the European Union, Note on the “Reintroduction of border checks pursuant to Article 2.2 of the 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement”, 10071/04, Brussels, 2 June 2004. 
c) Council of the European Union, Note on the “Application by Spain of Article 2(2) of the Schengen 
Convention”, 9181/04, Brussels, 4 May 2004. 
d) Council of the European Union, Note on the “Application by Portugal of Article 2(2) of the Schengen 
Convention”, 9804/04, Brussels, 25 May 2004. 
e) Council of the European Union, Note on the “Reintroduction of border checks on the basis of Article 2(2) of 
the Schengen Convention”, 11098/05, Brussels, 11 July 2005. 
f) Council of the European Union, Note on the “Extension of the reintroduction of border checks on the basis of 
Article 2(2) of the Schengen Convention”, 11909/05, Brussels, 2 September 2005; Council of the European 
Union, Note on the “Extension of the reintroduction of border checks on the basis of Article 2(2) of the 
Schengen Convention”, 5148/06, Brussels, 9 January 2006. 
g) Council of the European Union, Note on the “Introduction of border checks on the basis of Article 2(2) of the 
Schengen Convention”, 14823/05, Brussels, 24 November 2005. 
h) Council of the European Union, Note on the “Reintroduction of border controls on the basis of Article 2(2) of 
the Schengen Convention”, 6825/06, Brussels, 28 February 2006. 
i) Council of the European Union, Note on the “Reintroduction of border checks on the basis of Article 2(2) of 
the Schengen Convention”, 8839/06, Brussels, 2 May 2006. 
j) Council of the European Union, Note on “Border controls on the basis of Article 2(2) of the Schengen 
Convention”, 8543/06, Brussels, 2 April 2006. 
k) Council of the European Union, Note on the “Reintroduction of border controls on the basis of Article 2(2) of 
the Schengen Convention”, 12349/06, Brussels, 30 August 2006. 
Sources: Authors’ compilation based on the sources specified.  
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